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The Politics of Philosophy in Africa: A Conversation 
Ward E. Jones and Thaddeus Metz 
 
Abstract: The background to the present discussion is the prevalence of political 
and personal criticisms in philosophical discussions about Africa. As 
philosophers in South Africa – both white and black – continue to philosophize 
seriously about Africa, responses to their work sometimes take the form of 
political and personal criticisms of, if not attacks on, the philosopher exploring 
and defending considerations about the African continent. Both of us have been 
the targets of such critiques in light of our work. Our aim in this conversation is 
not to diminish or deflect such critiques. On the contrary, our aim is to 
understand them, to make them as strong as possible, and to bring them into the 
cooler realm of philosophical discussion. 
 
WEJ: Some years ago, my co-discussant, Thad Metz, published ‘Toward an 
African Moral Theory’ (2007a), and the article became the starting point of a 
continuing, extensive project of attempting to characterize and defend a moral 
theory – stated in a single, overarching norm – based on the set of interpersonal 
practices locally called ‘ubuntu’. The present article is a discussion of the political 
and personal objections that have arisen particularly in response to this project.  
The discussion focuses on five moral judgments about the wrongness of 
Thad’s philosophical project, judgments that Thad has encountered in print or in 
person on the occasion of publishing or giving a talk. My job here is to 
philosophically defend these concerns, as best as I am able. Thad’s job is to 
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respond to them. Insofar as we fail to capture a salient concern or point, we hope 
that others will contribute to these philosophical reflections. 
 So, Thad, let us begin our discussion. I would like to ask you three things 
before we turn to the criticisms themselves. First, would you like to characterize 
your project in your own words?  
 
TM: When I relocated from the States to South Africa in 2004 and became a 
lecturer at the University of the Witswatersrand (Wits), I judged myself to have 
a moral obligation to teach more than merely Western perspectives and authors 
in my courses, which focused on moral, political and legal philosophy. And so I 
set myself the task of becoming acquainted with the cultures of indigenous sub-
Saharan peoples and with the philosophies and related worldviews that emerged 
from them.  
I naturally began with local sources that discussed the beliefs and 
practices of, for instance, the Zulu, Tswana and Shona peoples, and then I 
expanded my range to include those of a couple dozen or so traditional peoples 
throughout the sub-Saharan region. Although I did not dismiss Euro-American 
writers, I focused principally on Africans recounting what they take to be 
important facets of their respective peoples’ ways of life.  
 As readers will know, it is standard for English-speaking, and more 
generally Western, ethical philosophers to lecture on moral theories such as 
egoism, utilitarianism, Kantianism and contractualism. (Indeed, sadly enough, it 
is common for Africans doing philosophy below the Sahara to focus exclusively on 
such theories.) When teaching at Wits, I thought it would be interesting to see 
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what an African moral theory would look like and how it might compare and 
contrast with the standard Western fare.  
While I definitely found hints of moral theories suggested by African 
philosophers, theologians and the like (see some quotations below), I did not 
encounter in the literature many who were systematically attempting to specify 
one that would both have a clearly African pedigree and be particularly 
attractive to a contemporary global audience of philosophers. I found that project 
of interest and decided to undertake it.  
 My strategy, first published in ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’, involved 
seeking a principle suggested by the literature that would clearly entail and best 
explain two groups of intuitions (particular moral judgments that are less 
controversial than the general principles being evaluated in light of them). One 
group of intuitions I considered to be ‘global’ in the sense that just about any 
ethicist working anywhere in the world would hold them, e.g., it is wrong to kill 
an innocent person for money or to have sex with someone without her consent.  
The other group of intuitions were judgments that, from what I could 
glean from my research, were much more recurrently held amongst indigenous 
African peoples and philosophers than amongst Western ones (and, indeed, those 
in the Confucian, Hindu, Islamic and many other traditions). For some examples, 
intellectuals from many different parts of sub-Saharan Africa have maintained 
that: consensus should be the default position when seeking to resolve political 
disagreement; reconciliation should the aim of criminal justice in the first 
instance; all able-bodied members of a society ought to pitch in to help one 
another harvest (or build, etc.), instead leaving individuals alone to take sole 
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responsibility for their plots; and there is a moral significance to greeting other 
people, such that it is not merely a matter of etiquette. Such perspectives have 
been salient in the indigenous sub-Saharan tradition of ethical reflection in a 
way they have tended not to be in others. 
 After specifying the key intutions, I worked through a number of 
theoretical suggestions from African thinkers that on the face of it promised to 
entail and explain them, and I argued that one, inspired by the remarks of 
Desmond Tutu about harmonious relationship being the greatest good, was more 
promising than the other five to be found in the literature at the time. After 
publishing ‘Toward an African Moral Theory’, I worked to refine the principle I 
had tentatively defended there, so that it would still be characteristically African 
and all the more philosophically appealing. Roughly, this principle is that an act 
is right if it respects others in virtue of their natural capacity to commune or 
harmonize, i.e., to be party to relationships of identity and solidarity with others; 
otherwise, an act is wrong, and especially insofar as it prizes discordance. 
And then, well, it didn’t take long before I came to believe this very theory 
that I had articulated. That is, while I had at first wanted merely to see what the 
most defensible theory of right action grounded on sub-Saharan mores would 
look like in comparison to Western theories, over the past few years I have 
argued that it in fact is more attractive than they are. It captures not only 
intuitions that are salient in indigenous African thought particularly well, but 
also does a better job than utilitarianism, Kantianism, and the rest of the West 
at entailing and explaining more ‘global’ intuitions. Or so I continue to contend. 
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WEJ: A second preliminary: I think that any discussion of politics in academia 
needs to begin by addressing the politics of the discussion itself. So, I think that 
we should speak about the politics of the present paper. We are two white 
Americans (who have each lived in South Africa for about 15 years), publishing a 
conversation about other persons’ judgments about your project. I am 
uncomfortable with this situation. I believe that this analysis would have been 
more important if one of the people having this conversation were someone to 
have initially advanced the criticisms. 
My defence of my own presence here is threefold. First, I am initially 
sympathetic to all of the judgments we discuss and rehearse here, and I think 
that we would have had difficulty finding anyone else (black or white, local or 
non-local) who was willing to defend them all. Second, I am quite simply 
interested in exploring and defending these views in my own way, so as to 
develop my own position on them. Third, I am hopeful that our discussion will 
spark a further discussion, in the philosophical community, about the politics of 
doing philosophy in and about Africa. 
 
TM: All that sounds right to me. Here are a couple more reasons to engage in 
this dialogue, and then to seek to publish it.  
For one, surely most of those who have criticized my work and yours have 
wanted us to pause and to rethink certain facets of our approaches. For us to do 
so, and do so in a public forum such as this, should be taken as a sign of respect. 
For another, those who have criticized us, at least as intellectuals with integrity, 
should also be willing to pause and to rethink, in light of our honest, considered 
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reactions to them. It seems fair to ask critics to reconsider their positions and, at 
the very least, the hostile ways they have sometimes advanced them. 
 
WEJ: A third preliminary point: I take it that most political and personal 
concerns in academia could be seen as attacks on the character of the person 
taking an academic stance. Political and personal attacks suggest an academic’s 
viciousness; they claim that in defending his or her position, the academic is 
displaying a non-virtuous, even base, attitude toward her subject matter, in this 
case the peoples and cultures of Africa. When I find it helpful, I will state how I 
see the criticisms below as holding that your project, and perhaps even you, are 
non-virtuous in some way.  
 However, readers should be well aware that you do not, of course, see your 
project (or yourself) in this way. You see it as expressive of virtue, something like 
respect and esteem for the culture that inspired the moral theory you are 
exploring and defending. Indeed, for you this respect and esteem are now 
apparently displayed in your sympathy with the position you have been 
developing. Is that right?  
 
TM: Absolutely.  
Rather than ignore African ideas when teaching and thereby give students 
the impression that only dead white guys can contribute to philosophical 
debates, I have worked to put African thinkers and thoughts at the core of my 
instruction.  
Rather than to neglect an entire centuries-old philosophical tradition that 
 7 
exists as a living body of thought, I have worked to learn from it and to 
incorporate promising ideas from it into my research.  
Rather than patronize African philosophers by simply recounting their 
views or using ‘kid gloves’ when evaluating them, I have taken the tradition 
seriously as philosophy, viz., as rational thought about fundamental matters, 
and criticized it where I have found it wanting.  
Rather than act as though African ideas have nothing to contribute to 
humanity’s development, I have sought to ‘export’ many of them to a global 
audience and to put them into dialogue with other philosophical traditions, 
mostly the Western but also recently the East Asian (e.g., Bell and Metz 2011; 
Metz 2014, 2017).  
Finally, rather than suggest that the theory I have advanced is solely a 
product of my own thought, I have acknowledged its sub-Saharan pedigree by 
often labelling it ‘African’; for me to have called it ‘Metz’s Theory’ would have 
been a kind of arrogance, even theft.  
 
WEJ: So, let us begin with a first criticism of your project:  
•A white person, especially one from overseas, should not talk about African 
ethics, since he was not reared in an African culture.  
This concern focuses on the methodology that you use in your theorizing 
about ubuntu. The usual method of working in ethics is to reflect upon one’s own 
moral commitments, and to then try to theorize about them in some way or 
another. You, in stark contrast, are dealing with other persons’ moral 
commitments. You gain your data, as it were, second- and third-hand, from 
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avowals from sub-Saharan Africans and from anthropological discussions of sub-
Saharan Africans. You report on sub-Saharan avowals, you do not make them 
yourself. If there is anything behind this first objection to your project, it must 
drive a wedge between your approach and the reflective methodology that we 
usually find in theorizing about ethics. There must be something special about 
our relationships with our moral norms that they should not be ‘reported on’. 
If this is correct, then all moral anthropology – as I think you call it at one 
point – is a dubious affair. The thought here, I think, is that moral anthropology 
disrespects a truly important element in moral thinking, an element your work 
at least initially ignored, namely that of avowal. Admittedly, you now profess to 
have some sympathy with the theory you explore, but you still present it as a 
theory based on other persons’ sympathies, not a theory based on your own. This 
is why you call it an ‘African’ moral theory. The moral anthropologist does not 
speak as a person who avows his findings, and that is a problem in the realm of 
morality.  
The culprit here, as I see it, is the role that our identities play in our lives. 
In speaking about moral intuitions, as you do in your work, you are speaking 
about people’s identities. But real-world – not imagined – identities should not 
be reported on, discussed in the third-person; they should be expressed, that is, 
avowed, by the persons whose identities they are. Our identities are precious to 
us, something we need to protect, nurture, and most importantly, affirm and 
defend. As a consequence, discussions of moral identities should in all cases 
involve an agent whose moral views they are, someone who can stand by and for 
the aspects of her identity being discussed. Identities are, at bottom, something 
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that should be spoken about only when there is someone present who can stand 
up for the identity being spoken about. As a consequence, we can take first-
person views of moral systems,1 but not wholly third-person views. Your project 
violates this norm; you speak about other persons’ identities without having 
them there to stand up for those identities. Accordingly, the vice here, perhaps, 
is one of neglect. 
 
TM: As you recognize, I do now accept the theory that I had initially presented as 
the most promising principled reconstruction of the sub-Saharan tradition. And 
so, even if I had been for a while ‘guilty’ of ‘merely reporting’, I no longer am.  
 However, even at the initial stages I was in fact not merely reporting. 
When determining which intuitions from the African tradition to use to evaluate 
competing candidates for a moral theory, I did not take them all on board. For 
instance, a number of Africans have judged ubuntu, in its most basic and literal 
sense of human excellence, to be available only to Africans or perhaps those 
initiated into a sub-Saharan culture (see, e.g., Gade 2012). From the beginning, I 
have judged that any philosophical interpretation of the African tradition that is 
attractive (at least to a global readership, if not to those who appreciate the 
deepest values of ubuntu) will deem human excellence not to be restricted on 
such a basis. So, in putting forth intuitions that were more African than 
Western, I was still employing my own judgment, advancing intuitions that 
could be appreciated not merely parochially, but also potentially by a much wider 
audience.  
                                                
1 And, perhaps, second-person views, in face-to-face encounters. 
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 Such ‘picking and choosing’ from sub-Saharan worldviews of course raises 
its own potential problems. But the present charge, of distancing myself from the 
norms and values and of not considering whether I can share them, simply is not 
true. If anything, I have from the start found the characteristically African moral 
judgments to be prima facie worth exploring, and would not have undertaken the 
project otherwise; consider that, upon relocating to South Africa, I did not 
attempt to undertake a theoretical unification of apartheid intuitions! And in 
commonly calling the theory I have advanced ‘African’, I was not attempting to 
put distance between myself and the theory, but instead, as noted above, to give 
credit where credit is due.  
 Now, there remains in your remarks a further point to which I have not 
yet replied. It is that, even supposing I were to be sympathetic to the salient 
African positions that I have advanced, I am speaking about people’s identities 
that I cannot fully share, by virtue of being an ‘outsider’.  
However, in using the term ‘African’ I did not mean to be speaking about 
living people’s identities, although I can see why interlocutors have reasonably 
thought that I have been. The term ‘African’ has of course been employed in a 
variety of ways. The main, theoretically useful way that I have used the term, as 
well as those like it such as ‘Western’ and ‘East Asian’, is to refer to features that 
are salient in a locale over a substantial amount of time, similar to the way that 
I see Steve Biko (1971) using the term ‘African’ in his ‘Some African Cultural 
Concepts’. In general, I use geographical labels to pick out properties that have 
for a long while been recurrent in a place in a way they have tended not to be 
elsewhere. For me, they denote fairly long-standing characteristics in a region 
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that differentiate it from many other regions. 
 The claim that geographical labels such as ‘African’ or ‘sub-Saharan’ can 
sensibly be used to pick out properties that have been salient in a particular 
space-time means that I am not using them to capture how a contemporary 
person who calls himself an ‘African’ conceives of himself. In calling a property 
‘African’, I am not seeking to explain to a particular individual who he is, and he 
could well fail to ‘find himself ’ reflected in the normative theory I construct, 
which is grounded on many ‘traditional’ or ‘pre-colonial’ insights into ethics. 
Using the term for the sake of self-understanding or identity politics is one thing, 
and using it to pick out a swathe of long-standing beliefs and practices 
indigenous to a certain region on which to ground a general ethical principle is 
another.  
I unfortunately believe that I have failed to draw this distinction 
adequately in my various talks and papers. And so when speaking of things 
being ‘African’, readers and listeners might well have been lead to suppose that I 
as an outsider am trying to explain to them who they are. But that has not been 
my aim; that is not the intended function of the moral theory.  
 
WEJ: The question now will be whether you can avoid speaking of people’s 
identities when you are speaking of their moral commitments. My hunch is that 
you cannot. We will return to identities below. 
Let us move on to a second moral critique of your work:  
•If a white person speaks about something ‘African’, he’s being derogatory, since 
the term has been used by the white community in that way in the past. 
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The idea here is a straightforward application of political correctness: if a word 
has been used in offensive ways, you get rid of it. That is why we no longer use 
certain words, for example, to refer to black persons, or women, or people of 
certain sexual orientations. Those people have told us that they no longer wish to 
be referred to in those ways, and we respect their wishes in that regard. 
Your response to this is a sensible one. You say, ‘Well, not all uses of the 
word “African” are derogatory’. You are right. There is a difference between some 
words (e.g., a certain word used to refer to black people in South Africa that 
begins with the letter ‘k’), which are always used in a derogatory way, and 
‘African’, which is not always used in a derogatory way. However, I do not think 
that this response is adequate. It misses the force of the thought that enough 
uses of the term have been derogatory that we should get rid of the weapon in 
people’s hands. We can draw an analogy here with real weapons: the reason I 
want to get rid of handguns in America (and South Africa) is that there’s just too 
much bad stuff happening with them; I simply don’t care enough about the good 
ways they are being used. 
I think that the jury should still be out on this issue. On the one side, 
there are those who say that we should get rid of the word. But, on the other 
side, what about those of us, we will respond, who want to keep the word so that 
we can speak about the injustices that have been committed and are still being 
committed upon Africans as a group?  But why, the first camp will rejoinder, 
should we continue to enable a discussion that has been, by and large, offensive?  
In any event, however, it must be up to the people who are referred to as 
‘Africans’ to decide whether they want to continue to be referred to in this way, 
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as a group. If they decide that they simply do not wish to be discussed by 
outsiders as a group, or if they want another word to be used in its place, then 
we should respect that. That is the deep and important point behind political 
correctness: people have the general right to determine how they are being 
spoken about. Their wishes here must be respected. ‘African’ is still a contested 
term. Until there is a consensus on the matter, you should not use the word 
‘African’ to refer to people on the continent, in either a disrespectful or an 
apparently respectful way. 
 
TM:  Yes, if a person I were calling a certain word did not want me to use that 
word, then I generally should not use it. I can think of exceptions, e.g., if 
someone is being an arsehole, there are situations where it can be permissible to 
call him one. But, often enough, and most clearly with folks who have done no 
wrong, one ought to defer to the wishes of those about whom one is speaking.  
Unclarity about how to proceed arises when the word one is using refers to  
more than one person, and those people have conflicting views. You have 
suggested that one ought to wait for consensus. However, consensus might never 
come, and what to do in that case? The best option seems to use the word the 
way that a large majority of those being spoken about would prefer, while doing 
what one can to acknowledge the minority’s perspective and go out of one’s way 
to put distance between oneself and any derogatory sense of the term. If there is 
indeed a sizeable minority, then I accept that should do more of the latter than I 
have up to now.  
 However, my impression is that there is in fact not a sizeable minority 
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offended by the use of the term ‘African’ by any given white person, and that 
indeed consensus in fact has come, so far as it could ever be expected. A number 
of people over the past decade or so have given me reason to doubt whether the 
word ‘African’ is the apt label for my moral theory. However, I can recall only one 
person doubting (in writing or in conversation or otherwise) that I should use it 
for the specific reason that whenever a white person uses the word it is offensive. 
For all I can tell, it is qualitatively different from other words, particularly one 
that begins with the letter ‘k’ in South Africa.  
 Of course, some other people surely share this one person’s judgment 
about the word ‘African’. But the key issue, I submit, is whether the numbers are 
so large as to warrant constant acknowledgement and qualification. I have not 
encountered evidence that they are, although I am open to being presented with 
such.  
Consider that self-described ‘Africans’ often use the label when naming 
themselves to a public audience and thereby invite those who do not describe 
themselves that way to use the term in a similar manner. The African National 
Congress and the African Union are just two examples (and then consider all the 
self’-described ‘African studies’ journals, centres, conferences, etc.). They have 
never indicated that white people should not call its members by the name 
‘African Union’ or ‘African National Congress’ because the word ‘African’ is in the 
name. Nor is there any sort of movement to get non-Africans to stop using these 
names.  
Notice I am not claiming that so long as a certain group uses a word to 
describe itself, outsiders may use the same word. I do not believe that; the fact 
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that some African-Americans at times use a word beginning with the letter ‘n’ to 
refer to themselves does not give me ethical license to do so. But notice that 
African-Americans have never to the best of my knowledge created an 
organization with this word in its name, which would invite others to call them 
with that word. In contrast, the word ‘African’ is routinely used by people who 
describe themselves as ‘African’ to name themselves for public purposes.   
 
WEJ: You are surely right that there are only a few people who think that white 
people should not use the word ‘African’, but it is not really a response to them to 
say that they are in the minority. You have not spoken to their concern, which is 
that the word has been and still is used in a demeaning way.  
 
TM: But not by me, and not by the overwhelming majority of people who use the 
word to label themselves to non-Africans. Above you suggested that it must be up 
to the people who are referred to as ‘Africans’ to decide whether they want to 
continue to be referred to this way, as a group. I agree, and, for all I can tell, they 
have decided it is OK, despite the reservations of a minority; otherwise, there 
would be widespread objection to white people using the name ‘African National 
Congress’, but there is not.   
 
WEJ: Let us move on to a third criticism of your work:  
•If a white person speaks about something ‘African’, he’s being essentialist. 
Your usual response to this objection is sensible enough. You say that you do not 
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claim that all traditionally oriented sub-Saharan Africans2 have the moral 
intuitions that you attribute to them. Rather, you say that these moral intuitions 
are simply prominent. You take essentialism about sub-Saharan Africans to be 
the position that all sub-Saharan Africans have some characteristic, and perhaps 
necessarily. You disavow yourself from this position, claiming merely that many 
of them do, or that they are found more often amongst sub-Saharan Africans 
than amongst other groups (e.g., Europeans). You make not a universal claim 
about all Africans, but a statistical or percentage generalization about them.  
However, I do not think that objectors really care about your distinction 
between essentialist claims and statistical claims. The statistical claims are still 
generalizations, and your generalizations about others lie squarely in the moral 
realm. It is not acceptable to say, ‘Black people have rhythm, but I do not mean 
all of them’. The concern here, as I see it, is that you are working with something 
uncomfortably related to a stereotype: ‘African people have such-and-such moral 
intuitions, but I do not mean all of them’. Like stereotypes about sub-Saharan 
Africans, you allow for exceptions. However, perhaps there is something wrong 
with making even ‘most’ claims about other races or cultures in some contexts, 
including a moral context.  
What could that be? Perhaps the problem is that your generalizations 
could themselves become stereotypes, or could become, for someone, 
explanatorily related to pernicious stereotypes. I can easily imagine someone 
                                                
2 In spite of the previous point, I will continue to use the word ‘African’ without 
scare quotes. I have explicitly noted that ‘African’ is a contested word, and so 
scare quotes can be assumed throughout my comments.  
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supporting his stereotype that sub-Saharan Africans have too many children 
with your (anthropologically gained) generalization that sub-Saharan Africans 
highly value family. Or imagine someone supporting his stereotype that sub-
Saharan Africans are not good leaders with your (anthropologically gained) 
generalization that sub-Saharan Africans seek consensus in leadership, along 
with the (very dubious) claim that good leadership requires decision-making in 
the face of dissent. Your generalizations about other people’s moral identities 
have an uncomfortable relationship to stereotypes. 
I think that there are complicated and sensitive issues here about 
generalizing across cultures and the dangers of stereotyping. It is a fraught area 
in which people rightly worry about the dangers of disrespecting other people’s 
individuality. At issue here is not the truth of your generalizations. They may be 
true. The danger is in the use to which they are being put in your work. As 
Lawrence Blum writes, ‘Some moral distortions are common to all stereotypes – 
moral distancing, failing to see members of the stereotyped group as individuals, 
and failing to see diversity within that group’ (2004: 251). What Blum claims on 
behalf of stereotypes holds for generalizations in general, especially those about 
other persons’ identities. Generalizing about peoples’ identities creates moral 
distance, and hides the individuality and diversity amongst the people whom you 
are describing. Generalizing about the ethical lives of sub-Saharan Africans 
amounts to a misguided relationship with them. Generalizations about identity, 
even if true, homogenize a group, and lead us, from the outside, to disregard 
particularity and difference of identity within the group.  
It would have been better, in this regard, for you not to have spoken of 
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your theory as an ‘African’ moral theory, but rather for you to have spoken of it 
as a theory grounded in imaginary intuitions, or a theory grounded in certain 
persons’ intuitions, persons who – it need not and should not be said – happen to 
be African. It would have been better to call it, say, a ‘Desmond Tutu moral 
theory’ rather than an ‘African moral theory’.   
 
TM: As I’ve said above, when using the term ‘African’ I am not trying to capture 
the identities of contemporary people who call themselves ‘African’. Towards the 
start of your remarks you acknowledge that I am aiming to capture salient 
features of many cultures in a particularly large space-time, often called ‘pre-
colonial’, ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ sub-Saharan Africa, but then later on 
characterize my project as making ‘generalizations about other people’s moral 
identities’. I think there is a difference, certainly conceptually and probably 
morally, about these projects.  
I am glad you accept that I am not guilty of the sin of essentialism. If the 
word ‘African’, as I and social theorists tend to use it, merely picks out features 
that are characteristic of that place, then it is clearly possible for these features 
to be present neither universally in Africa, nor necessarily there (nor only there). 
What counts as ‘African’ can (and of course does) change, at least over a span of 
time. But you are right there remain deep and compelling concerns. In 
particular, you have identified real issues regarding stereotyping and, more 
broadly, failing to treat people as particular individuals or groups.  
 It is true that I do not focus on differences amongst sub-Saharan 
individuals and peoples in my published work. I had to focus on them when I was 
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learning about various thinkers and cultures below the Sahara; for just two 
examples, I took cognizance of the differences between spirits recognized by the 
Shona and Ndebele peoples in Zimbabwe, as well as differences between Yoruba 
and Igbo cosmologies in Nigeria. However, the project of constructing a plausible 
general moral principle out of recurrent features in sub-Saharan Africa over a 
long span of time has indeed meant glossing such particularities in my research. 
The question, now, is whether that evinces a kind of character flaw (and, if so, 
whether it is nonetheless justified all things considered by some other, moral 
consideration). 
 First off, note that I do not believe that the project of developing such a 
moral theory is immoral by virtue of my expressing stereotypes or other 
derogatory characterizations of African peoples. Notice how you have had to add 
onto my original ways of speaking in order to raise this concern; you have spoken 
of ‘someone’ making claims that I simply do not make. 
Now, I do accept that others could put my research to use for nefarious 
purposes (as, say, Social Darwinists did with respect to the theory of natural 
selection), that my work could unintentionally enable someone to express 
stereotypes. And I accept that I have a responsibility to go out of my way to do 
what I can to prevent that (which I have done in papers and talks on occasion, 
but perhaps not enough) as well as to rebut misuse if and when it occurs (so far, 
so good, so far as I know). However, these points are consistent with the idea 
that I am morally permitted, and not being vicious, to engage in the project of 
developing a moral theory grounded on salient sub-Saharan mores. 
You make the interesting suggestion that instead of calling the moral 
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theory ‘African’, I should have called it ‘Desmond Tutu’s’. That would be a way of 
acknowledging particularity, you suggest.  
However, it is not well described that way. For one, it’s not Tutu’s theory; 
he is not engaged in the project of systematically advancing a basic principle that 
plausibly entails and best explains a wide array of less controversial judgments 
about right and wrong action and that would find resonance not merely amongst 
traditionally oriented Africans, but more broadly.  
For another, it’s not Tutu’s theory; although I have drawn on his remarks 
about harmony, there are many other thinkers who have made similar comments 
and whose work I have cited, drawn upon and otherwise considered. For 
example, others who are naturally read as having placed harmonious 
relationships at the centre of their peoples’ moral thought, and often sub-
Saharan thought more generally, include: the South Africans Mogobe Ramose, 
Nhlanhla Mkhize and Yvonne Mokgoro; the Zimbabweans Munyaradzi Felix 
Murove and Nisbert Taringa; the Kenyans Henry Odera Oruka and Dismas 
Masolo; and the Nigerians Egbeke Aja and Pantaleon Iroegbu (citations available 
on request). And then there are also Euro-American anthropologists, sociologists 
and the like whom I could cite. The greater the number of people beyond Tutu 
who have made his point independent of him, the less the point should be 
ascribed to him in particular, and should be characterized more broadly.  
Furthermore, I have repeatedly made a point in my work, including in the 
first article on African ethics, that there are a variety of candidates for an 
African moral theory. Although I favour a certain secular conception of harmony 
as grounding the most attractive one, I have routinely pointed out that there are 
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welfarist, vitalist and religious strains of thought that exist in the sub-Saharan 
tradition and that also deserve philosophical attention.  
 
WEJ: Let us move on to a fourth criticism of your project:  
•An analytic philosophical method is unAfrican, and is rather a Western 
‘scientistic’ importation; indeed, it is a colonial suppression of an African method.  
 
Your usual reply to this objection is that it is simply a matter of generalizing 
intuitions into a single normative statement. What could be simpler, and 
plainer? This reply is disingenuous. This is not really your fault; it is a problem 
with the whole culture of analytic philosophy. We analytic philosophers are 
terrible about wearing our agendas and our methodological tools on our sleeves. 
We are too ready to say, ‘I’m just thinking clearly, nothing more; anyone could do 
this’. We forget all about the history behind us which taught us that the very 
particular things we are doing are worth doing. 
We could talk about the methodological tools you use: reflective 
equilibrium is not a universal approach to moral intuitions; you got it from the 
work of John Rawls. But the tools you use are intimately wrapped up with your 
aim. You have a seriously focused agenda. You got your agenda - that of boiling 
down a whole moral system to a single normative statement - from a precise 
point deep in your culture: Immanuel Kant’s Grundlagen. Your project is deeply 
Western. 
The point is that what you end up with cannot be an African portrayal of a 
moral system. It is a Western portrayal – perhaps, a Western appropriation – of 
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an African moral system. The title of your original paper is starting to look like it 
overreaches. An ‘African Moral Theory’ is ambiguous between ‘a moral theory 
based on lower-level African moral norms’ and ‘a moral theory that is African 
(whatever that would look like)’. The concern is that what you achieve cannot be 
the latter. The criticism here is: What you are doing is not the way Africans 
would approach, engage with, or attempt to portray their own moral landscape. 
It is seeing another culture in the way that Kant saw his own; it is ‘Kanting’ 
another culture. However, you felt, and continue to feel, that it is important that 
you call this theory ‘African’. But the theory is not African. It is a deeply Western 
attempt to portray a set of African ethical norms. 
Is it wrong for you to do so? As my sympathy with the previous intuition 
indicates, I have particularist leanings, and so I look kindly on the thought that 
generalizations like the one you cull from sub-Saharan practices distort moral 
thought. However, the objection here lies in the possibility that sub-Saharan 
Africans might also have particularist leanings, and find in your theory a 
distortion of their preferred way of being in the moral world. This problem, as I 
see it, arises only in so far as you present your theory back to sub-Saharan 
Africans, for them to accept as a useful and appropriate representation of their 
moral lives. In doing so, you are asking them to accept a distinctly Western 
treatment of their own moral system. This is where the concern about 
suppression of African thought comes into play. In so far as you are vying for 
position as a contender representation of sub-Saharan African morality, you are 
shouldering out African’s own, distinct representations of their moral landscape. 
I think that this concern has considerable force, with regard to how you 
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describe what you are doing. This brings us back to the question of the 
appropriateness of the title of your original paper – ‘Toward an African Moral 
Theory’. This concern – indeed all of these concerns – would have gone away if 
you had just published your paper as a new ethical theory that you wanted to 
explore, perhaps starting with your favoured quotation from Tutu. 
 
TM:  Two points, here. First, I need to distance myself from the repeated 
characterization of my favoured theory as a ‘representation’ of African morality. 
It is not, and was never intended to be. Although there have been some in the 
literature who have suggested that something akin to my moral theory is in fact 
an accurate description of traditional African morality, I do not present it as that 
(and, given my distance from appeal to ancestors and related spiritual elements, 
I could not plausibly do so). Instead, I have said that my favoured principle is 
prescriptive; it is one that ought to be believed as capturing the way people ought 
to treat each other. 
 
WEJ: Let me interrupt, before you move onto your second point. You have to 
take yourself to be describing African moral thought. Otherwise, you would not 
call your theory an ‘African’ moral theory. It cannot plausibly be an African 
moral theory if it does not in any way capture African moral thought. 
 
TM: Yes, the theory must be continuous with African worldviews in order to 
merit the label. But that is different from having to accurately represent them in 
full in order to merit it. 
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Now, let me return to my second thought. While it is true that there is a 
noticeable particularist strain amongst African thinkers, it is not the only 
method that one encounters in the literature. I can cite about a couple dozen 
different African philosophers, theologians and the like who have approximated 
the project of systematically advancing a favoured moral theory. Here are some 
quotations to give the reader a taste:  
- ‘Individuals are good in so far as they fulfil their duties to promote, support and 
protect the vital force within the community’ (Kasenene 1994: 141, on southern 
African morality; cf. Kasenene 1998: 21, 67). 
 
- ‘(E)very Akan maxim about the specifically moral values that I know, explicitly 
or implicitly, postulates the harmonization of interests as the means, and the 
securing of human well-being as the end, of all moral endeavour’ (Wiredu 1996: 
65). 
 
- ‘(T)he strengthening and the growth of life are the fundamental 
criteria….Usually, only that kind of behavior which leads to the building up of 
the community is morally good’ (Bujo 1997: 27, on African ethics). 
 
- ‘The conclusion that Africans are persistently in search of harmony in all 
spheres of life is pertinently true of African thought….This speaks to the ubuntu 
understanding of cosmic harmony. It must be preserved and maintained by 
translating it into in all spheres of life’ (Ramose 1999: 59, 64). 
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- ‘In no way is any thought, word or act understood except in terms of good and 
bad, in the sense that such an attitude or behavior either enhances or diminishes 
life’ (Magesa 1997: 58, on ethics in Eastern Africa). 
 
- ‘(O)ne should always live and behave in a way that maximises harmonious 
existence at present as well as in the future’ (Murove 2007: 181, on Shona 
ethics). 
 
- ‘African morality originates from considerations of human welfare and 
interests, not from divine pronouncements. Actions that promote human welfare 
or interest are good, while those that detract from human welfare are bad….’ 
(Gyekye 2010). 
This list is not at all exhaustive, and I cite in my forthcoming book (Metz 2016) 
many other African thinkers, including Tutu (1999: 35) of course, who make 
similar kinds of comprehensive claims. Far from importing Kant (or Kelsen, as 
per Mogobe Ramose’s severe criticism of my work), African philosophers 
themselves have often appreciated the search for system (perhaps including 
Ramose himself on occasion, it would seem, given the quote above). I view my 
work as an extension of what they have begun, in a prescriptive direction in 
contrast to what has often been a descriptive one on their part. 
However, suppose, for the sake of argument, that I were importing a non-
African method and applying it to an African content. To advance some kind of 
novel, hybrid philosophy need not be to ‘suppress’ or ‘shoulder out’ other 
approaches. I have not presented my work as the only way to interpret African 
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normative ideas. I have instead tried to make it clear that I have a specific aim 
in mind, viz., the aim of constructing a moral theory informed by salient 
indigenous sub-Saharan values and norms that would give a global audience 
something to rival Western theories, an aim that I do not suggest that others 
must adopt.  
To be sure, I argue that my favoured principle is the best moral theory. 
However, that is not to imply that it is the best, let alone solely viable, 
philosophy, which might not be ‘theoretical’ in my sense. 
I hope that readers would be pluralists with me and agree that there 
should be space for a variety of approaches to a subject matter. In particular, 
focusing on the general should be seen as complementary to focusing on the 
particular; what is to stop one from doing both, and in light of one another? 
 
WEJ: Pluralism aside, we are dealing with your moral theory, and whether it 
deserves the moniker ‘African’. You respond to this criticism by citing African 
authors who take the Kantian approach to theorizing moral theory. The 
proponent of this critique of your work will simply say that this points to the 
legacy of the Kantian approach in African moral thought. These authors, like 
you, are steeped in Western thought. As you asserted above, Kant looms over 
African thought.  
 Your response, in consequence, says little to the original concern. Before 
Kant, authors did not engage in this pursuit. Plato and Aristotle, for example, 
did not; Hobbes and Hume did not. How can your theory be an African moral 
theory when it is so Kantian? And we can press a related question of both you 
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and Kant: Who is to say that the sub-Saharan African on the street is at all 
inclined to work with a systematized single statement of the kind that you offer?  
 
TM: I read you as making two criticisms, that my approach objectionably eclipses 
other ones, and that it does not deserve the label ‘African’. So, I think my 
response above is clearly relevant with regard to the first point.  
 Regarding the second, it is true that indigenous African peoples, and their 
philosophers, tended not to engage in normative ethical theorization of the 
systematic sort for which I aim. And, so, given the way I usually employ the term 
‘African’, as picking out salient features over a long span of time in a certain 
region (not as the way contemporary people on the street understand 
themselves), my method might well not count. That’s a fair point. 
However, my ethical philosophy is a combination of a certain method and 
a certain content, and my suggestion is that the latter has such a clearly sub-
Saharan pedigree that my philosophy merits the title on balance. I made this 
kind of point a while back with an analogy (Metz 2007b: 376, from which the rest 
of this paragraph borrows). Suppose Western science (bracket for now the 
controversy about such a phrase) showed that a certain plant indigenous solely 
to South Africa has healing powers. I submit that it would be sensible to call the 
treatment a ‘South African’ one, despite the existence of a Western proof that it 
is effective. Similarly, I am trying to show that a moral principle grounded on 
norms and values salient below the Sahara desert can be justified by using the 
methods of analytic philosophy. The method alone, supposing it is ‘Western’, 
should not be sufficient to disqualify the defended philosophy as ‘African’.  
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WEJ: Finally, let us move on to a fifth moral criticism of your work: 
•A white person should not talk about things ‘African’, since doing so occludes 
Africans from speaking about themselves.  
 
We end with the most personal concern of the bunch. The best way to read this 
objection is not really that you occlude someone else from working on this topic. 
As you often say, you do not prevent anyone from working on any topic they 
please, and you have even helped others to develop and publish their own, 
competing views. Rather, the problem is that you are doing it instead of someone 
else.  
As much as I value the work you have done, I guess that I find something 
to regret in the fact that it was not done by someone else. Philosophy is at its 
most important (and profound) when it is reflective, and so it would have been 
better for it to have been a reflective, insider achievement. It would have been a 
different kind of achievement, but an achievement to be applauded in a way 
beyond your achievement. This is not to say that you should not have done the 
work that you have done. This objection need not say that at all. However, it is to 
lament that it was you, and not someone else, who has done it. 
 
TM: Yes, I feel the force of that last sentence.  
It is worth reflecting on why we have this inclination. I presume we do not 
feel this way, or at least not to the same degree, about the great Italian 
filmmakers who captured American culture so brilliantly or the German social 
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theorists who did so upon having escaped the Nazis and moved to New York and 
California. We do not think that it would have been (much) better had 
Americans rather made the films and written the books. 
The difference is probably that we route for the underdog, the one who has 
been oppressed, has not received adequate acknowledgement, apology and 
compensation for the oppression, and indeed has continued to be wronged in 
serious ways. Part of the oppression has been epistemic, as has been poignantly 
described by various African thinkers as a process of ‘spiritual genocide’ (Vilakazi 
1998: 76), ‘cultural violence’ (Odora Hoppers 2000: 5), ‘symbolic castration’ (2001: 
74) and ‘epistemicide’ (Ramose 2004: 156). We want the one oppressed to 
overcome the oppression; it would make for a better narrative for those people’s 
agency to be what does the job.  
In reply, notice that wishing that someone else had undertaken this 
project does not necessarily mean that my having done so was base or otherwise 
immoral. To regret and to lament are not to resent (and, so, it is not clear that I 
need to repent!).  
However, one might suggest (as a thoughtful anonymous referee has) that 
I was lacking virtue in failing to be patient and to let someone else take centre 
stage. Should I have waited for Africans to articulate and express their own 
moral vision and to send it to the rest of the world? Did I objectionably deny 
them a special moment in undertaking my project?  
I have three things to say in response. First, my work is plainly not the 
first to bring indigenous sub-Saharan ideas to an English-speaking audience. 
Africans such as Bénézet Bujo, Kwame Gyekye, Pauline Hountondji, John Mbiti, 
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Kwame Nkrumah, Henry Odera Oruka, Mogobe Ramose, Léopold Senghor, 
Godwin Sogolo and Kwasi Wiredu developed sophisticated philosophies grounded 
on traditional African perspectives and published book-length statements of 
them in English in the 20th century (citations available on request). My 
philosophy is different from theirs, and I have sought to publish in places they 
have not. However, it is overblown to speak of Metz as having been the first to 
set foot on the moon of a globalized African philosophy. 
Second, it is not clear that my particular philosophy could have been 
easily done by someone else, at least not soon. My publications are the result of a 
pretty idiosyncratic background: an activist American teenager who found the 
early Marx, the Situationist International and the anarcho-syndicalist tradition 
politically compelling; an undergraduate who heavily studied sociological theory, 
the Frankfurt School and Kant’s three Critiques; a graduate student who 
learned analytic philosophy and came to accept the causal theory of linguistic 
reference and (following from that) both scientific and moral realism; a young 
lecturer whose tenure requirements were stiff, requiring him to learn how to 
publish in certain kinds of fora; a man in love who relocated to South Africa and 
spent more than a decade there; a professor who deemed himself obligated to 
teach the sub-Saharan tradition to his African students; and a research professor 
with time on his hands to write and resources with which to network. And then 
there are considerations of psychology and character, too. Perhaps it would not 
have been likely that someone else would have published what I have.   
For a third and final point, note that it is difficult to make this present, 
fifth criticism while also accepting the previous criticisms. There is a tension in 
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claiming both that my project should not have been undertaken in the way it has 
been, which the first four criticisms amount to saying, and that my project 
should have been undertaken but by someone other than me. If the reader finds 
this last concern to be particularly strong, then she is logically committed to 
thinking that the previous criticisms are weak.3  
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